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In this paper, I suggest an outline of a new interpretation of core issues in Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I argue for three major theses.​[1]​ (1) In the first part of the paper I show that the celebrated Spinozistic doctrine commonly termed “the doctrine of parallelism” is in fact a confusion of two separate and independent doctrines of parallelism. Hence, I argue that our current understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind is fundamentally flawed.​[2]​ (2) The clarification and setting apart of the two doctrines will also put us in a position to present my second major thesis and address one of the more interesting and enduring problems in Spinoza’s metaphysics: how can the attribute of thought be, on the one hand, isomorphic ​[3]​ with any other attribute, and yet, on the other hand, be isomorphic with God himself, who has infinitely many attributes? In the second part of the paper, I present Spinoza’s solution to this problem. I argue that the number and order of modes is the same in all attributes. Yet, modes of Thought, unlike modes of any other attribute, have an infinitely-faceted internal structure so that one and the same idea represents infinitely many modes by having infinitely many facets (or aspects). (3) This new understanding of the inner structure of ideas in Spinoza will lead us to my third thesis in which I explain and solve another old riddle in Spinoza’s metaphysics: his insistence on the impossibility of the human mind knowing any of God’s infinite attributes other than Thought and Extension. In the third part, I show some of the major ramifications of my new interpretation and respond to some important objections. In my conclusion I discuss the philosophical importance of my interpretation. I explain why Spinoza could not embrace reductive idealism in spite of the preeminence he grants to the attribute of Thought. I argue that Spinoza is a dualist -- not a mind-body dualist, as he is commonly conceived to be, but rather a dualist of Thought and Being. Finally, I suggest that Spinoza’s position on the mind-body issue breaks with the traditional categories and ways of addressing the subject by suggesting a view which grants clear primacy to Thought without accepting any idealist reduction of bodies to thought.
Yet, before we begin our journey into the labyrinth of ideas and parallelisms in Spinoza, it might be helpful to prepare the ground with a concise clarification of the three building blocks of Spinoza’s ontology: substance, attributes, and modes. According to Spinoza, God is the only substance, or thing whose existence and conceivability do not depend on anything else. All other things are merely modes of God. Hence, all mountains, rocks, crocodile bodies and crocodile minds, elephant bodies and elephant minds, human bodies and human minds, and all thoughts and bodies in general are merely modes of God. A comparison with Descartes’ views may help illuminate Spinoza’s understanding of substance and modes. Spinoza and Descartes agree that God is the only substance in the full sense of the word, i.e., God is the only thing whose existence is not dependent upon anything else. Descartes, however, allows for the existence of created substances, whose existence is not dependent on anything but God’s concurrence.​[4]​ Of such a kind are, according to Descartes, all human minds and apparently also all extended bodies. Cartesian modes are merely states of substances such as the shape of a certain table, whose existence is dependent upon that of the table. Spinoza rejects the Cartesian notion of created substances. He is simply not willing to accept this in-between category of things whose existence is almost independent of anything else. Hence, for Spinoza, all things apart from God are merely modes of God.
I turn now to the attributes. For Descartes, attributes are properties which constitute the essences of things; each thing has one, and only one, (principal) attribute, which constitutes its essence. Hence, extension is the essential attribute of all extended substances, or bodies, and thought is the essential attribute of all thinking substances, or minds.
In Spinoza, we get a different picture. God, the only substance, is identified with nature; extension and thought are two attributes of this one substance (or of Nature). Unlike Descartes, Spinoza has no problem with one substance (i.e., God) having a multiplicity of essential attributes. God’s attributes, according to Spinoza, are the fundamental and irreducible aspects of God which are adequately discerned and conceived by any intellect.​[5]​
certain ways of adequately conceiving God. We can conceive God under the attribute of extension. In this way, God is the one and only extended substance, which is the subject in which all extended things (bodies) inhere. We can also conceive God under the attribute of thought. In this way, God is the one and only thinking substance, which is the subject in which all thoughts inhere. God, in fact, may be conceived in infinitely many ways; however, our minds can conceive God only under the two attributes of Thought and Extension (even though we know that God has infinitely many other attributes).​[6]​ Since all things are modes of God’s attributes, the attributes are also the basic ways of adequately conceiving any existing thing.
Finally, we should take notice of the difference between Spinoza and Descartes in regard to the relation between bodies and minds. For Descartes, according to some readings, bodies and minds are causally connected with each other, while God concurs with these causal relations. Spinoza denies the possibility of any interaction between things which belong to different attributes. What then is the relation between physical and mental items according to Spinoza? Well, for Spinoza, physical and mental items are parallel aspects of one and the same thing, and here we arrive at the first topic of this paper: the doctrines of parallelism.

Part I: Spinoza’s Two Doctrines of Parallelism.
1.1 The locus classicus of the so-called “doctrine of parallelism” is E2p7. Here Spinoza states:
E2p7: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things [Ordo, et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo, et connexio rerum].
In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza claims:
E2p7s: [W]hether we conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, that is, the same things follow one another [unum, eundemque ordinem, sive unam, eandemque causarum connexionem, hoc est, easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus] [Emphasis mine].
A common reading of these two passages is that they assert a parallelism among all the attributes.​[7]​ Each attribute has infinitely many modes, and in each attribute we find the same causal structure, or order, connecting all the modes of the attribute. Arguably, this reading is wrong. Indeed, in the scholium to E2p7 Spinoza claims that the order of modes in each attribute is one and the same, but he says nothing of the sort in E2p7. In other words, E2p7 and its scholium assert two separate and distinct doctrines of parallelism. The former asserts a parallelism between the causal order of ideas and things, the latter a parallelism among the causal order of modes in each of the infinitely many attributes. Already at this preliminary stage, we can begin to see the difference between the two doctrines if we pay attention to the fact that E2p7 asserts a parallelism  between two domains of entities (ideas and things), while E2p7s asserts  a parallelism among infinitely many domains (the infinitely many attributes).
	In order to make clear the distinction between the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7 and the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s it might be helpful to consider the following two cases in which one of these two parallelisms obtains while the other does not.
	Let C be an attribute of God other than Thought and Extension, i.e., C is one of the infinitely many attributes unknown to our mind. According to the Inter-Attributes Parallelism (E2p7s), attribute C parallels Extension (i.e., modes of Extension and modes of C share the very same causal order). Yet, the Ideas-Things Parallelism (E2p7) seems to say nothing about C’s relation to Extension.​[8]​ All that the Ideas-Things Parallelism demands is an isomorphism between all ideas (modes of Thought) and all things. The Ideas-Things Parallelism says nothing about how the various attributes (i.e., their modes) are to be related among themselves. The Ideas-Things Parallelism seems to be perfectly compatible with a state of affairs in which two (non-Thought) attributes do not parallel each other. In such a case, the Ideas-Things Parallelism will obtain while the Inter-Attributes Parallelism will be violated.
	Now let’s check whether the opposite case, in which the Inter-Attributes Parallelism but not the Ideas-Things Parallelism obtains, is possible. This seems to occur in the case of ideas of ideas, or in general terms, higher-order ideas. The Ideas-Things Parallelism demands that insofar as ideas too are things,​[9]​ and insofar as God knows all things by having ideas thereof (E2p3),​[10]​ second order ideas whose objects are first order ideas must parallel them.
In contrast, the Inter-Attributes Parallelism is completely indifferent to the question of the parallelism among ideas and higher order ideas. Thus, if there were no parallelism among ideas of different orders, the Ideas-Things Parallelism would be violated, but not the Inter-Attributes Parallelism. We have shown that each doctrine has implications that cannot be derived from the other and that the truth conditions of the two doctrines are not the same. Hence, we may tentatively conclude that the two doctrines do not entail each other. 
	1.2 Four Crucial Observations. - Before we proceed any further we must make a few crucial observations. First, we should note that the term ‘parallelism’, though commonly employed in scholarly literature, was never used by Spinoza.​[11]​ We may keep on using it if we are careful to avoid one undesirable connotation. ‘Parallelism’ commonly implies a relation between two classes of objects which are distinct from each other. This is not always the case with Spinoza’s parallelisms, since, as we will soon see, in the case of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism, the modes which are parallel to each other are also identical with each other. Thus, we should keep the term ‘parallelism’ neutral as to whether things that are parallel to each other are also distinct from each other. 
	This brings us to the second point. In the scholium to E2p7, Spinoza claims that parallel modes in different attributes are “one and the same thing [una, eademque est].” Hence, the Inter-Attributes Parallelism involves identity (i.e., modes of different attributes which parallel each other are also identical with each other). Spinoza makes no similar claim about the Ideas-Things Parallelism, and for a good reason. Some ideas cannot be identical with their objects. Take, for example, the idea of God [Idea Dei].​[12]​ According to Spinoza, the idea of God is an infinite mode of Thought.​[13]​ The object of this idea is God. Since God is a substance and the idea of God merely a mode, and since there is no sharper distinction in Spinoza’s system than that between substance and mode, it seems that there cannot be a relation of identity between the two.
	Third, we should note another crucial difference between the two doctrines of parallelism. The Ideas-Things Parallelism is a representational parallelism, i.e., the idea of a thing X not only corresponds to X but is also an idea about X, or an idea which represents X.​[14]​ This is not necessarily the case with the Inter-Attributes Parallelism. The idea which corresponds to Napoleon’s body is indeed an idea about Napoleon’s body, but the mode of the third (and unknown) attribute which corresponds to Napoleon’s body is not about Napoleon’s body, nor is Napoleon’s body about this mode of the third attribute. This is so because representation is an essential feature of modes of Thought and only modes of Thought. Thus, unlike the representational nature of the Ideas-Things Parallelism, the Inter-Attributes Parallelism is merely a bare, or ‘blind’, parallelism.​[15]​
	Finally, we should notice that both the Inter-Attributes Parallelism and the Ideas-Things Parallelism entail the more specific parallelism between minds (modes of Thought) and bodies (modes of Extension). For this reason, the minds-bodies parallelism exemplifies the characteristics of both the Inter-Attributes Parallelism and the Ideas-Things Parallelism (i.e., it involves both identity and representation relations). Insofar as the relation between minds and bodies is a relation between ideas and things, the parallelism between them is representational; insofar as minds and bodies are modes of two different attributes, each mind (mode of Thought) is identical with its parallel body (mode of Extension). Yet, we should be careful to distinguish the different sources for these two features of the mind-body parallelism. The overlapping of the two general doctrines of Ideas-Things Parallelism and Inter-Attributes Parallelism in the relation between minds and bodies explains the common tendency to confuse the two general parallelisms. Since the relation between minds and bodies is by far the most visible manifestation of both parallelisms, it is natural to confound the two separate doctrines of parallelism into one and ascribe to it both representational character and identity of parallel items.
	1.3 At this point we may wish to consider two other questions. First, we would like to know whether, whenever Spinoza refers to the two doctrines later in the Ethics, he is aware of the difference between them and does not use the one in order to make a point that can be proven only by the other (for example, that he does not use the Inter-Attributes Parallelism to prove the existence of ideas of ideas). An examination of Spinoza’s applications of E2p7, E2p7c and E2p7d in the rest of the Ethics, though not conclusive, is consistent and even tends to confirm the claim that Spinoza distinguished between the two doctrines. Since almost all of the applications of these doctrines in the later parts of the Ethics pertain to the relation between minds and bodies, and since the parallelism between minds and bodies is a direct result of both the ideas-things parallelism and the inter-attributes parallelism, it is hard to draw a decisive conclusion from these applications. It is, however, clear that Spinoza does not confuse the doctrines, and he never refers to E2p7 in claiming that two parallel items are “one and the same thing.” This point is quite important since, as I have suggested, it is only in the case of the inter-attributes parallelism that parallel items are identical with each other. ​[16]​
	Secondly, though we have shown that the two doctrines do not entail each other, we may still wish to examine what is the motivation behind each doctrine, and the extent to which the doctrines rely on shared sources. In what follows I argue that, surprisingly, there is hardly any overlap in the justification of the two doctrines and that Spinoza did not rely on either doctrine in proving the other.​[17]​
	Spinoza’s demonstration of E2p7 is extremely short: “This is clear from 1A4. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the cognition of the cause of which it is the effect.” E1a4, to which Spinoza appeals here, reads: “The cognition of an effect depends on, and involves, the cognition of its cause [Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit].” Despite the cryptic nature of this argument, it seems that we can rescue its basic meaning if we interpret the dependence relations in E2p7d and E1a4 as causal relations.​[18]​ Under this interpretation, E1a4 stipulates that the idea of an effect is caused by the idea of the cause. An iteration of this demand generates two parallel chains of things and ideas.
	Though at first sight the demonstration of E2p7 may seem straightforward, it involves some problems.​[19]​ Fortunately, most of the gaps in the argument were filled by previous scholars.​[20]​ For our purpose, it is sufficient to make clear that Spinoza’s justification for the Ideas-Things Parallelism (E2p7) relies primarily on E1a4, and clearly not on the Inter-Attributes Parallelism (E2p7s).​[21]​
	Does the Inter-Attributes Parallelism rely on the Ideas-Things Parallelism? This might be a natural thought, yet I think the answer to this question is in the negative. As I have already pointed out (and will later show​[22]​), the Ideas-Things Parallelism does not entail the parallelism among non-Thought attributes, while the Inter-Attributes Parallelism explicitly claims that when we consider nature “under any other attribute” we will find the same order and connection of causes (E2p7s). 
	How does Spinoza justify the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s? The text of E2p7s does not refer to E2p7, nor does it provide any explicit demonstration of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism. At the beginning of the scholium, Spinoza asks the reader to recall two doctrines which were already proven in Part One: the definition of attribute (E1d4) and substance monism (E1p14). It is clear, I think, that the Inter-Attributes Parallelism somehow relies on these two doctrines, but the question is how. 
Schol.: Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we showed [NS: in the First Part], viz. that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also [Sic etaim] a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. (Italics mine). 
The standard reading of this passage is that it invokes the doctrine of substance monism or the identity of the thinking substance and extended substance, which was proved in E1p14.​[23]​ This is true, but apparently only part of the truth. I would argue that when Spinoza asks the reader to “recall what we have showed [in the First Part],” he refers not only to the identity of the thinking and extended substance – which appears before the “Sic etiam” - but also to the identity of thinking and extended modes,​[24]​ which is mentioned immediately afterwards. But where in the first part does Spinoza discuss the identity of modes?
	In order to answer this question we must first clarify a terminological equivocation which, though trivial, is a cause of some confusion in the existing literature. In his Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Jonathan Bennett suggested that in addition to the modes of the attributes Spinoza’s ontology includes modes which are attribute-neutral, i.e., modes which do no belong to any attribute. These trans-attribute modes - or differentiae, as Bennett calls them - are the underlying units which are shared by parallel modes of different attributes. If we take for example the parallel pair of my mind and my body, there is, according to Bennett, a D1 that is shared by both my mind and my body. My body would then be D1 plus Extension (or D1 under Extension), and my mind, D1 plus Thought (or D1 under Thought). Because the differentiae are not conceived under any attribute, Bennett rightly concludes that “it is absolutely impossible for any mind, however powerful, to have thought of [the differentiae] in abstraction from both thought and extension”.​[25]​ Bennett goes as far as to argue that the inconceivable differentiae are in some sense “the most basic properties of the substance”, and that they are even more fundamental than the attributes.​[26]​
	As far as I can see, this imaginative suggestion of Bennett cannot be accepted for a trivial reason: for Spinoza nothing can be inconceivable. In E1a2, Spinoza stipulates, “What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself [Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet].” Because Bennett’s differentiae cannot be conceived either through themselves or through another, E1a2 rules out their very possibility. Furthermore, in E1p10s Spinoza explicitly states “nothing in nature is clearer that each being must be conceived under some attribute.” ​[27]​ I do agree, however, with Bennett about the need to postulate some trans-attribute units of modes. Unlike Bennett, I think that we cannot speak of modes under no attribute, but only of either modes of a specific attribute, or modes under all attributes.​[28]​ Let us call the former ‘Modes of an Attribute’ and the latter, ‘Modes of God’. An example of a mode of an attribute would be Napoleon’s body, or, another example, Napoleon’s mind. Similarly, the modes belonging to the unknown attributes which parallel Napoleon’s body are each ‘mode of an attribute’, i.e., modes belonging to the specific attribute under which they are conceived. A mode of God is a mode under all the attributes, hence we can roughly say that Napoleon’s body together with Napoleon’s mind and all he other modes (of the unknown attributes) which parallel Napoleon’s body, constitute one single mode of God. The relationship between a mode of God (i.e., a mode under all attributes) and the modes of attributes which constitute this mode of God is the same as the relation between God (i.e., the substance under all attributes), and the substance as conceived under a specific attribute. In the rest of this paper I will refer to attribute-specific units as aspects (or heterogeneous aspects) of the same thing under all attributes. This notion of an aspect is modeled after the relationship of Spinoza’s attributes to the substance. In both cases (i.e., (a) modes of attributes as aspects of a mode of God, and (b) attributes as aspects of God), the attribute-specific unit is one aspect of one and the same res, having infinitely many aspects.
	Developing a complete reading of the nature of the attributes in Spinoza is beyond the scope of this paper. Previous scholars have occasionally hinted at the view of the attributes as aspects of the substance.​[29]​ In another work I begin to develop such a reading of Spinoza’s attributes in a more systematic manner. ​[30]​Yet, since the notion of an aspect plays a considerable role in this paper, and since this notion is not extensively studied and elucidated in current metaphysics and philosophy of language,​[31]​ let me make few succinct points clarifying my understanding of it. First, the relationship of being an aspect, modeled after the relation of the attributes to the substance, is not reducible to any of the other chief relations one finds in Spinoza’s philosophy. Particularly, being an aspect is clearly distinct from being a part of a thing: Spinoza’s attributes are not parts of the substance, since the substance is indivisible (E1p13). Being an aspect of a thing is also distinct from being a mode of a thing, since Spinoza’s attributes are not modes of the substance.​[32]​ Unlike a mode, which is dependent on the substance in order to be and be conceived, an aspect (or an attribute) does not exhibit such dependence. 
	Secondly, for Spinoza, the attributes are self-conceived (E1p10), and items belonging to different attributes are causally and conceptually severed from each other (E2p6). For this reason I hinted earlier that Spinozistic aspects are heterogeneous to each other, i.e., they cannot be caused, conceived or explained through each other.​[33]​
	Thirdly, the primary context in which this relation shows its colors is discussions of identity. For Spinoza, to say that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same (E2p7s) is equivalent to saying that the thinking substance and the extended substance are two (heterogeneous) aspects of the very same thing. Similarly, when Spinoza argues that the human body and mind are one and the same thing, conceived under different attributes (E3p2s), he is saying that that the mind and body are two aspects of the same thing.
	Admittedly, these brief clarifications fall short of fully explaining Spinoza’s understanding of the relation between the attributes and the substance. Yet, however important this subject is, it is still tangential to my main concern. In fact, I urge the reader to pick whatever interpretation of the relationship between the substance and attributes in Spinoza she prefers. I would only argue that the very same relation also obtains among other units in Spinoza’s metaphysics, namely, among modes of attributes and a mode of God (modes of attributes relate to their mode of God just as the attributes relate to God), and, as I will later suggest, among idea-aspects and the idea of which they are aspects.
	The distinction between modes of attributes and modes of God is well observed in the existing literature on Spinoza, and several other terms were used to designate it. Sometimes the term ‘mode’ is used to designate the entity I call ‘a mode of God’, while ‘modal expression’ is used instead of my ‘mode of an attribute.’ ​[34]​ It is important to point out that Spinoza himself never made this distinction explicit. In most cases, he uses ‘modus’ to refer to a mode of a specific attribute, though on several other occasions, primarily at the beginning of the Ethics where Spinoza refers to the “affections of substance” (e.g., E1d5, E1p1, E1p5d), he seems to be referring to modes of God. Consider

E1p30: An actual intellect… must comprehend God’s attributes and God’s affections, and nothing else.
E2p4d: An infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God’s attributes and his affections [praeter Dei attributa, ejusque affectiones].
In both texts Spinoza attaches the modes directly to God, not to the attributes. It is also significant that the definition of mode (E1d5) does not refer to the attributes. Obviously, modes of God are conceived through God while adhering to the regime of the separation of attributes; each aspect of a mode of God (i.e., a mode of an attribute) is conceived through God under the same attribute (an extended body is conceived through the extended substance, etc). Thus, on my reading both modes of God and modes of attributes are conceived through the attributes (the former are conceived through all the attributes so that each aspect is conceived through the attribute to which it belongs). Now we may return to Spinoza’s derivation of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism.​[35]​
	In E1p16, Spinoza states that “[f]rom the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modi [infinita infinitis modis sequi debent].” Notice the duplication of infinity in this sentence. One might be tempted to read E1p16 as claiming that infinite attributes follow from God’s nature and that each attribute has infinitely many modes. This reading cannot be right. For Spinoza, the attributes do not follow from God’s nature, but are God’s nature. What follows from God’s essence, or nature, are the modes.​[36]​ Hence, the infinitely many things which follow from God’s nature in E1p16 must be the modes. Yet, E1p16 states a second infinity; each of these things, or modes, follow from God’s nature in infinitely many ways [modi]. This second infinity is not a mere typo, since Spinoza repeats the duplication of infinity in his discussion of the nature of God’s idea (E2p4). What are then the infinite ways by which each mode follows from God’s essence? Arguably, the things which follow from God’s nature are the infinitely faceted units which I call ‘modes of God’ (i.e., modes under the infinitely many attributes), and the infinitely many ways by which each mode of God follows from God’s nature are the infinitely many modes of attributes which are aspects of the same mode of God. ​[37]​ According to my reading of E1p16, my body and my mind are just two out of the infinite aspects of a mode of God which follows from God’s nature.​[38]​ Each aspect is just the very same thing which follows from God’s nature, as conceived under a certain attribute. Thus, the identity of modes of different attributes was arguably proven in E1p16, and it is only recalled in E2p7s.​[39]​ We may push further and ask what are Spinoza’s reasons for accepting the infinitely faceted structure of modes in E1p16, and the answer seems to be given by the only text invoked in E1p16d: the definition of God (E1d6). Indeed the duplicated infinity is already asserted in this crucial definition. Obviously, the full implications of the double infinity in the definition of God could not be spelled until other critical elements of Spinoza’s philosophical machinery are brought to the foreground (particularly, the barrier among the attributes (E1p10)).​[40]​ Yet, as far as I can see this machinery is already set up by the time we reach E1p16, and thus the double infinity in E1p16 already commits Spinoza to the existence of infinitely faceted modes.​[41]​
	The reading outlined above has several vital advantages. First, it motivates the identity of parallel modes of all attributes and not only of Thought and Extension (as is the case with the standard reading of E2p7s). Furthermore, it provides an explanation for the enigmatic double infinity asserted in E1p16. Finally, given the fact that part two of the Ethics is dedicated to the study “of the nature and origin of the mind,” it would make much more sense for Spinoza to prove the identity of modes of different attributes in part one, since this doctrine belongs to the core of Spinoza’s ontology and pertains only tangentially to the discussion of the human mind, which is the subject of part two of the Ethics. On the other hand, the Ideas-Things Parallelism truly belongs to part two insofar as it deals with representation and the nature of Thought.
	1.4  Summary. - In this part, I have argued that Spinoza had not one, but two, doctrines of parallelism and that the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7 is a doctrine independent from the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s. Furthermore, the parallelisms claimed by each doctrine have characteristics that are not shared by the other doctrine. The Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7 and E2p7c is essentially a representational parallelism, but it does not entail the identity of parallel items. The opposite is true in the case of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s: it stipulates that parallel items in the various attributes are identical, yet it does not involve any representational relation between items which parallel each other. We can now formulate the two doctrines:
Inter-Attributes Parallelism: The causal order of things in each attribute corresponds to the causal order of things in each of the other attributes. In addition, parallel items are just different aspects of one and the same thing.
Ideas-Things Parallelism: The causal order of ideas corresponds to the causal order of things. In addition, ideas represent the things which parallel them.
I have also argued that Spinoza provides different justifications for these two doctrines, and that he is careful in not blurring the two doctrines. The temptation to merge the doctrines results from the fact that both of them entail (independently) the mind-body parallelism, which is a major theme in parts two through five of the Ethics, and is clearly the most visible application of both doctrines from the perspective of the human mind.​[42]​
	
	Part II: The Multifaceted Structure of Ideas
	2.1 The distinction between the two doctrines of parallelism will help us to address one of the deepest and oldest problems of Spinoza’s metaphysics. According to the Inter-Attributes Parallelism the causal order of ideas, or modes of Thought, is equal to the causal order of modes in any other attribute. If any of the attributes were numerically richer than the rest, the one-to-one correspondence among the attributes, i.e., the Inter-Attributes Parallelism, would collapse. Yet, according to the Ideas-Things Parallelism, the causal order of Thought-items is supposed to be equal to the causal order of things, which includes all the modes of all the infinitely many attributes. Hence, Thought appears to be infinitely richer than any other attribute. In other words, the two doctrines of parallelism seem to be utterly incompatible with each other.
I will shortly present Spinoza’s interesting solution to this problem. But before we turn to the solution, let’s have a look at Edwin Curley’s elegant presentation of the problem through three diagrams. 
We have to say either (1) that the attribute of thought is coextensive with all of the other attributes combined, or (2) that just as there is an attribute of thought corresponding to the attribute of extension, so there are infinitely many other attributes of thought corresponding to some one of the other unknown attributes.... Neither of these pictures is the one we should expect, which looks more like this (3).​[43]​ 
Curley’s graphical description of the problem is very helpful; yet, I think he is wrong in claiming that the picture we should expect to find in the Ethics is only (3). (3) is indeed claimed by Spinoza. This is the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s. However, Spinoza clearly commits himself to (1) as well. This is roughly the picture we get from the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7 (I say roughly, because Thought should also appear as one of the attributes which are the object of Thought in diagram 1, i.e., it should appear both in the right and middle columns). Finally, I believe diagram (2) is also true in a certain sense. How could that be? How could all three diagrams be true?
	In order to present Spinoza’s solution to this crucial problem we will have to address another problem which has long been regarded as one of the thorniest and most enigmatic in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Spinoza defines God as a substance of infinitely many attributes (E1d6), yet he restricts human knowledge to the attributes of Extension and Thought (E2a5). In other words, God or nature has infinitely many aspects that are as extensive as Thought and Extension, and yet they are not accessible to our mind. Why do we not know any of these infinitely many attributes of God (or nature)?  Before we address this question let me first sketch an outline of my solution to the problem of the compatibility of the two doctrines of parallelism. 
	Spinoza’s solution to the problem of the compatibility of the two parallelisms is simple. The order of ideas is the same as the order of modes in any of the other attributes. However, modes of Thought, unlike modes of any other attribute are multifaceted, in fact, infinitely faceted. Each idea has infinitely many aspects (or facets), so that each aspect of the idea represents a parallel mode under another attribute. Hence the more precise diagram is (4). 

							Representations (idea-aspects) of Extension and its modes	
				Extension		Representations (idea-aspects) of Thought and its modes
				Thought - - - - - -	-	Representations (idea-aspects) of Attribute X and its modes
	(4) Substance				Representations (idea-aspects) of Attribute Y and its modes





	We have seen earlier that a mode of God (a mode under all attributes) has infinitely many aspects, each being a mode of an attribute (see 1.3 above). The relation between a mode of God, and its infinitely many aspects is precisely the same as the relation between God and the infinite attributes. In both cases it is one and the same entity having infinitely many aspects, so that the aspects are causally and conceptually independent from each other. Now, in order for Thought to reflect properly the order of modes (E2p7), modes of Thought (i.e., ideas) must have the very same infinitely faceted structure as the modes of God they represent. Thus, I would argue, each idea has infinitely many aspects, so that each idea-aspect represents uniquely a mode of God under a particular attribute (i.e. a mode of an attribute). These ideas-aspects relate to the infinitely faceted idea in the same way the infinitely many modes of attributes relate to a mode of God, and the infinitely many attributes relate to God. In all three cases we have a res (Substance, Mode of God, the infinitely faceted idea) having infinitely many aspects (each aspect tied to a particular attribute, and each aspect being causally and conceptually independent from the other​[44]​). Thus, the number and order of modes of Thought (i.e., the infinitely faceted ideas) is equal to the order and number of modes in any other attributes, but each mode of Thought (unlike modes of other attributes) refracts into infinitely many aspects. A single mode of Thought (i.e., each infinitely faceted idea) is able to represent distinctly each of the infinitely many modes which parallel it in the infinitely many attributes by having infinitely many aspects.​[45]​
	In the rest of the paper I will elaborate on this view, document it in Spinoza’s text, and attempt to respond to possible objections. I turn now to the closely related issue of our ignorance of all attributes other than Thought and Extension.
	2.2  In E2a5, Spinoza claims that
We neither feel nor perceive any singular things [NS: or anything of Natura naturata], except bodies and modes of thinking. 
It is this limitation of human knowledge to modes of Extension and Thought which bothered Baron Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, one of Spinoza’s most acute correspondents.​[46]​ On the 25th of July, 1675, G.H. Schuller, a friend of both Spinoza and Tschirnhaus, sent to Spinoza a letter in which he forwards a number of questions by Tschirnhaus. The first of these questions is the following:
Would you, Sir, please convince him [Tschirnhaus] by a positive proof, and not by reductio ad absurdum, that we cannot know any more attributes of God than Thought and Extension? Further, does it follow from this that creatures constituted by other attributes cannot on their side have any idea of Extension? If so, it would seem that there must be constituted as many worlds as there are attributes of God... And just as we perceive apart from Thought, only Extension, so the creatures of those worlds [creaturæ illorum Mundorum] must perceive nothing but their own world’s attribute, and Thought. (Ep. 63) ​[47]​
Four days later, Spinoza replies,
[T]he human mind can acquire knowledge only of those things which the idea of an actually existing body involves, or what can be inferred from this idea. For the power of any thing is defined solely by its essence (E3p7), and the essence of the mind consists (E2p13) solely in its being an idea of an actually existing body. Therefore the mind’s power of understanding extends only as far as that which this idea of the body contains within itself, or which follows therefrom. Now this idea of the body involves and expresses no other attribute of God than Extension and Thought. For its ideate [ideatum], to wit, the body (E2p6) has God for its cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of Extension, and not under any other attribute. So (E1a6) this idea of the body involves knowledge of God only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension. Again, this idea, insofar as it is a mode of thinking, also has God for its cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute (E2p6). Therefore the idea of this idea involves knowledge of God insofar as he is considered under the attribute of thought, and not under any other attribute (E1a6). It is thus clear that the human mind - i.e., the idea of the human body - involves and expresses no other attributes of God except these two. Now (by E1p10), no other attribute of God can be inferred or conceived from these two attributes [nullum aliud Dei attributum concludi, neque concipi potest], or from their affection. So I conclude that the human mind can attain knowledge of no other attribute of God than these two, which was the point at issue. With regard to your further question as to whether there must therefore be constituted as many worlds as there are attributes, I refer you to the Scholium on Proposition 7, II of the Ethics. (Ep. 64. Italics mine).
In this passage Spinoza claims that the human mind is nothing but the idea of the (human) body. More importantly, Spinoza makes clear that from ideas of bodies we cannot derive knowledge, or ideas, of any attributes other than Thought and Extension. Spinoza justifies the last claim by pointing to the conceptual separation of the attributes (E1p10). Spinoza’s invoking of E1p10 in the context of our possibility of having knowledge or ideas of other attributes seems to imply that not only modes of different attributes are separate from each other, but also ideas of modes of different attributes - though belonging to the same attribute - are conceptually separate from each other. This interesting point will become explicit in Spinoza’s next letter. Note that Spinoza’s reply to Tschirnhaus provides an explanation for the in principle impossibility of knowing modes of other attributes, just as Tschirnhaus requested.​[48]​
	On his side, Tschirnhaus seems to be unsatisfied with Spinoza’s reply, and presents Spinoza with an excellent objection. If my mind knows my body, and my body is identical with a mode of the third attribute (as Spinoza claims in E2p7s), i.e., they are “one and the same thing,” how can I know my body and yet be completely ignorant of the corresponding mode in the third attribute?
Will you please let me have a proof of your assertion that the soul [anima] cannot perceive any more attributes of God than Extension and Thought. Although I can understand this quite clearly, yet I think that the contrary can be deduced from the Scholium or Proposition 7, Part II of the Ethics...
Although I do indeed gather from your text that the world is one, it is also no less clear therefrom that the world is expressed in infinite modes, and that therefore each single thing is expressed in infinite modes. Hence it seems to follow that, although the particular modification which constitutes my mind and the particular modification which expresses my body are one and the same modification, this is expressed in infinite modes - in one mode through thought, in another through extension, in a third through some attribute of God unknown to me, and so to infinity.​[49]​ For there are infinite attributes of God, and the order and connection of their modification seems to be the same in all cases. Hence there now arises the question as to why the mind, which represents a particular modification - which same modification is expressed not only by Extension but by infinite other modes ​[50]​ - why, I ask, does the mind perceive only the particular modification expressed through Extension, that is, the human body, and not any other expression through other attributes? (Ep. 65).
To this question Spinoza replies:
... However, in reply to your objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God, the infinite ideas in which it is expressed​[51]​ cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing [unam eandemque rei singularis Mentem], but an infinity of minds. For each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the others [quandoque unaquaeque harum infinitarum idearum nullam connexionem invicem habent ], as I have explained in that same Scholium to Proposition 7, Part II of the Ethics, and as is evident from Proposition 10, Part I. If you give a little attention to these, you will see that no difficulty remains, etc. (Ep. 66. Italics added).
Commenting on this and the previous letters, Jonathan Bennett writes: “In the two late letters he tries to avoid this conclusion [that we must know modes of the third attribute, if such an attribute exists] by a move which is so abrupt, ad hoc, and unexplained that we cannot even be sure whether it is a retraction of the metaphysics or of the epistemology.”​[52]​ Joachim’s judgment, though less harsh and self-confident, seems to be utterly desperate: “Nobody has yet succeeded in elucidating Spinoza’s reply [to Tschirnhaus] in Letter 66.”  ​[53]​
	One point which we must note in regard to the last letter is that it is apparently only a remaining fragment of a longer letter (my quote contains the remaining text in its entirety).​[54]​ But this still does not help us answer the crucial questions raised by the existing content. (I) How can a thing be “expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God?” (II) Why do the infinite ideas, which are the infinite expression of the same thing, have no connection with each other? (III) Why can’t the infinite ideas of a singular thing constitute “one and the same mind” of that thing? (IV) How are these infinite ideas related to God’s infinite intellect? And, finally, (V) how does Spinoza derive his claims In Ep. 66 from E1p10 (the conceptual barrier) and E2p7s (the inter-attributes modes identity)? We may add a further question regarding Letter 64: (VI) what exactly was Spinoza’s reply to Tschirnhaus’s suggestion that there are “as many worlds as there are attributes of God”?
	Tschirnhaus, not being satisfied by Spinoza’s answer, tries to address the same issue from a slightly different angle:
The second cause which has prevented me from following his explanation as set out is this, that in this way the attribute of Thought is given a much wider scope than the other attributes. Now since each of the attributes constitutes the essence of God, I fail to see how the one thing does not contradict the other. (Ep. 70. Italics mine)
Tschirnhaus’s objection is clearly appropriate. If the infinite ideas which represent all bodies are not connected to the infinite ideas which represent all the modes of the third attribute, it would seem that Thought has more modes (i.e., ideas) than Extension. 
	Unfortunately, however, Tschirnhaus prefaced this important question by another objection which is based on a misunderstanding of E2p5. Most likely, this misunderstanding resulted from a textual corruption in Tschirnhaus’s manuscript of the Ethics (or from a mistake in Schuller’s report of Tschirnhaus’s objection). This allowed Spinoza to answer Tschirnhaus’s first question (regarding E2p5) by pointing out the error in Tschirnhaus’s text, and thus to avoid the far more important second question.​[55]​
	There is one more important issue in Letter 70 which is relevant to our inquiry. In Letter 70, Tschirnhaus asks for Spinoza’s consent to “have Spinoza’s writings communicated to Leibniz,” with whom Tschirnhaus had recently struck up a friendship. Tschirnhaus also assures Spinoza that “he has made not the slightest mention of [Spinoza’s writings]” in his conversations with Leibniz.​[56]​ Spinoza, being extremely cautious at this period of his life, refused to grant his consent since Tschirnhaus did not know Leibniz long enough to be able to trust him and to be assured of his open minded views. As we shall soon see, Tschirnhaus did share with Leibniz his knowledge of the Ethics. Indeed, one of the more important sources which will help us clarify the claims Spinoza expresses in letters 64 and 66 is Leibniz’s report of a conversation he had with Tschirnhaus about these issues.
	In the appendix to this article I suggest a simple notation which presents the view I ascribe to Spinoza and the exchange with Tschirnhaus in a more rigorous manner. I will shortly turn to answer the questions we have just raised regarding the exchange with Tschirnhaus. Yet, before we turn to this task, let me make first a brief clarification. Recall our suggestion that Spinoza’s use of the term ‘mode’ is equivocal insofar as it designates both modes of a specific attribute and modes of God (i.e., modes under all attributes). Similarly, Spinoza uses the term ‘an idea of mode x’ as referring both to ideas of modes of specific attributes and to ideas of modes of God (being under all attributes). In order to retain the distinction between ideas of modes of God and ideas of modes under specific attributes, I will call the latter ‘idea-aspects’, while the former will be referred simply as ‘ideas’.	
	2.3      
	I. How can a thing be “expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God”?  
In Ep. 65 Tschinhaus confirms that “each single thing is expressed in infinite modes” (each under another attribute), or in the terminology I have been using, each mode of God has infinitely many aspects. In Ep. 66 Spinoza is claiming that each idea of a mode of God has infinitely many aspects just like the infinitely-faceted structure of its object. Spinoza stresses that the idea of a mode of God has infinitely many aspects only in God’s infinite intellect which conceives the mode of God under the infinitely many attributes. The idea of a mode of God as it is in the human mind (which knows only modes of Thought and Extension) is limited to only two aspects of God’s idea of the same mode of God: the idea-aspect representing the same mode of God under Extension, and the idea-aspect representing the same mode of God under Thought.​[57]​
	II. Why do the infinite ideas, which are the infinite expressions of the same thing, have no connection with each other?
Just as the infinite aspects of the same mode of God (or in Spinoza’s terminology, the infinite expressions of the same thing) have no causal or conceptual connection with each other, so too the infinitely many idea-aspects which represent the infinitely many aspects of the same mode of God
have to have no – causal or conceptual - connection with each other (according to E2p7).​[58]​ Thus, in addition to the causal and conceptual barrier among the attributes (E1p10), there is a parallel barrier within Thought which separates representations of different attributes.
	III. Why can the infinite ideas of a singular thing not constitute “one and the same mind” of that thing? 
The infinite idea-aspects which represent the same mode of God under all attributes do not constitute “one and the same mind of a singular thing” because this infinitely faceted idea exists only in God’s intellect, while the term ‘mind [mens]’ refers only to the thought of finite entities (i.e., “singular things”). Throughout his writings Spinoza hardly ever uses the term ‘mens Dei’. Indeed, in the TTP, Spinoza explicitly criticizes scriptural reference to God’s mind, claiming that such language is grossly anthropomorphic and in his letters he makes a sharp distinction between mind and intellect.​[59]​ In the Ethics, Spinoza consistently ascribes intellect but never mind to God. We may wonder why an infinite being can have an intellect but not a mind. Though Spinoza does not addresses this question explicitly, I think he considered the denotation of the term ‘mind’ to include mental operations such as imagination, which cannot be ascribed to God due to its distorting nature.
	Thus, each idea-aspect is the mind of a mode of an attribute (e.g., my mind -- being just one aspect of an infinitely faceted idea in God -- is the mind of my body), but the infinitely faceted idea which represents a mode of God under all the attributes, cannot be properly called ‘a mind,’ since God is not a “singular thing,” i.e., a finite being. Essentially, this is just a matter of precise terminology.
	IV. How are the infinite ideas related to God’s infinite intellect? 
Every idea in God’s absolutely infinite intellect has infinitely many aspects, each of which represents a mode of God under a different attribute. Note that God’s idea (which, as we have already seen (§1.2), is identical with God’s absolutely infinite intellect) is infinite in two distinct respects: (1) it is composed of infinitely many ideas (which represent all of God’s modes), and (2) each of these ideas has infinitely many aspects. Each idea-aspect is also a part of an infinite chain of idea-aspects which represent all the modes of a certain attribute.​[60]​ Thus, the idea-aspect representing Josephine’s body (aka, Josephine’s mind), the idea-aspect representing Robespierre’s body (Robespierre’s mind), and the idea-aspect representing Napoleon’s body are all parts of an infinite chain of idea-aspects which represent all extended things. This is the infinite chain of bodies’ minds. Similarly, the idea-aspects representing those modes of the third attribute, which are identical to the bodies of Josephine, Robespierre and Napoleon, are parts of the infinite chain of idea-aspects which represent all modes of the third attribute. These two infinite chains of idea-aspects are causally and conceptually independent from each other, just like their ideata. Each infinite chain of idea-aspects is an aspect of God’s absolutely infinite intellect, just as each infinite chain of things under a specific attribute is an aspect of the infinite chain of modes of God (being under all attributes). Thus, God’s absolutely infinite intellect is isomorphic with the absolute infinity of God himself.
	V. How does Spinoza derive his claims in Letter 66 from E1p10 and E2p7s? 
E1p10 erects a conceptual among the attributes. E2p7s asserts that parallel modes of different attributes are identical with each other.  Thus, E1p10 and E2p7s impose a certain order among the modes. In Letter 66, Spinoza argues that stipulations parallel to E1p10 and E2p7s should also hold with regard to representations of modes of different attributes. Minds of modes of different attributes have no – causal or conceptual - connection with each other (this is the reflection within Thought of E1p10). Just as a mode of God has infinitely many aspects (i.e., parallel modes of attributes), so too the idea of a mode of God has infinitely many, parallel, idea-aspects (this is the reflection in Thought of the order of parallel modes of attributes, asserted at E2p7s).
	VI. What exactly was Spinoza’s reply in Letter 64 to Tschirnhaus’s suggestion that there are “as many worlds as there are attributes of God?”
If ideas of modes of different attributes “have no connection with each other,” one might think that each attribute and its representation in Thought (i.e., the infinite chain of idea-aspects which represent it) constitute a separate world. Thus, all bodies together with their representations in Thought would constitute one world: the world of extended things and their minds. Similarly, all modes of the third attribute together with their representations would constitute another world: the world of modes of the third attributes and their minds. It seems that the reason Tschirnhaus was tempted to conceive the pair of each attribute and its representation in Thought as a separate world was the strict separation of the minds of modes of different attributes. If minds of modes of different attributes are not accessible to each other, one might think these minds (and their objects) belong to different worlds. Spinoza’s only objection to this description was that it failed to recognize that a mode of God under the various attributes is still “one and the same thing,” i.e., that the attributes are only aspects same reality (E1d4).​[61]​ In order to make this point clear, Spinoza asks Tschirnhaus to consult E2p7s, which states that parallel modes under different attributes are “one and the same thing,” and thus belong to one and the same world.
	2.4 I now turn to providing textual support that corroborates the following two claims of Spinoza in Letters 64 and 66:
(1) The modes of the unknown attributes have ideas (technically, idea-aspects) which are their minds, just as the idea (technically, idea-aspect) of our body is the mind of our body; and
(2) Minds, or ideas (technically, idea-aspects), of modes of different attributes have “no connection with each other.” 
By showing that Spinoza held both doctrines throughout his writings, I wish to block any attempt to disqualify Letters 63-66 as eccentric texts which have nothing to do with the core of Spinoza’s metaphysics. After I accomplish this task, I will turn to providing textual support for the even stronger claim:
(3) If Xn and Xm are the same mode of God being conceived under different attributes (so that n≠m), then the representation of Xn is also identical with the representation of Xm; representations of Xn and Xm are just two aspects of the same idea in God’s intellect (just as Xn and Xm are two aspects of the same mode of God).
	In the following passage from Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza commits himself only to (2). The passage relies on the parallelism between things and ideas (which Spinoza calls here, “objective essences” ​[62]​) in order to conclude that things do not interact with each other if and only if their ideas do not interact with each other.	
[T]he idea is objectively in the same way as its object is really. So if there were something in Nature that did not interact with other things, and if there were an objective essence of that thing which would have to agree completely with its formal essence, then that objective essence would not interact with other ideas, i.e., we could not infer anything about it. And conversely, those things that do interact with other things (as everything that exists in Nature does) will be understood, and their objective essences will also have the same interaction, i.e., other ideas will be deduced from them, and these again will interact with other ideas. ​[63]​
The subject of this passage is not the issue of the ideas of the unknown attributes. Yet, it clearly commits Spinoza to the position that ideas of modes of different attributes cannot interact with each other. The counterfactual tone of the passage discloses that in this period Spinoza believed that there were no two things in nature that were not connected. This is consistent with the fact in the TdIE the barrier among the attributes has not yet been established, as I will explain shortly.
	 The next passage, from the Short Treatise, claims explicitly that modes of attributes, other than extension, also have a soul.​[64]​
[T]he essence of the soul [dan zoo] consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of extension do.​[65]​
A few paragraphs below, Spinoza concludes his discussion of the nature of the soul and repeats the claim that modes of the unknown attributes also have a soul.
This is why we have used these words in the definition, that the soul is an Idea arising from an object which exists in Nature. And with this we consider that we have sufficiently explained what kind of thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expression not only the Ideas that arise from corporeal modes, but also those that arise from the existence of each mode of the remaining attributes. ​[66]​
The most intriguing point about Spinoza’s discussion of the other attributes in the Short Treatise is that in this text Spinoza is not certain that we cannot know any attributes other than Thought and Extension. In a famous note at the beginning of the Treatise he writes:
After the preceding reflection on Nature we have not yet been able to find in it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves that these would be the only ones of which this perfect being would consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that there are infinite perfect attributes which must pertain to this perfect being before it can be called perfect. (Italics mine) ​[67]​
This tentativeness of our ignorance of other attributes seems to be related to another important feature of the Short Treatise. It is well known that in the Short Treatise the barrier among the attributes is much weaker than in the Ethics (if it exists at all);​[68]​ in various places in the Short Treatise, Spinoza takes ideas to be caused by their objects.​[69]​ Now, once we undermine the barrier among the attributes, we cannot be sure any more that one attribute cannot be conceived through another and that there cannot be causal interaction between minds of modes of different attributes. And thus, the possibility that at some point in time we could gain knowledge of other attributes through our knowledge of Extension and Thought remains open.
	The next texts I wish to consider are some notes written by Leibniz following a conversation he had with Tschirnhaus about the doctrines of the Ethics.
He [Spinoza] thinks that there are infinite other positive attributes besides thought and extension. But in all of them there is thought, as here there is in extension. What they are like is not conceivable by us; every one is infinite in its own kind, like space here [Putat infinita alia esse attributa affirmativa praeter cogitationem et extensionem, sed in omnibus esse cogitationem ut hic in extensione; qualia autem sint illa a nobis concipi non posse, unumquodque in suo genere esse infinitum, ut hic spatium].​[70]​
There is a clear similarity between these notes of Leibniz and Tschirnhaus’s claims in Letters 63 and 65.​[71]​ Both understand Thought to be preeminent to the extent that it has ideas which correspond to each of the attributes, and both understand the pair of any extra-Thought attribute together with its representation in Thought to constitute a separate world or domain (note Leibniz’s use of the indexical “like space here”). And finally, both Leibniz and Tschirnhaus understand Spinoza as claiming that these ‘worlds’ are not accessible to each other. Thus, Leibniz too understands Spinoza as claiming that (1) modes of other attributes have ideas, and (2) these ideas are separate from each other. ​[72]​
	I turn now to a somewhat difficult yet important text from the Ethics. Proposition 13 of part two of the Ethics reads,	
The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the [/a] Body, or a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else [Objectum ideae, humanam Mentem constituentis, est Corpus, sive certus Extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud]
The proposition attempts to rule out the possibility of two scenarios: (1) that the object of the human mind is something other than the body, and (2) that the object of the human mind is the body and some other thing too. But what is this ‘aliud’, or ‘other thing’, whose inability to constitute the object of the human mind Spinoza attempts to prove? There seem to be two main ways to read this passage: either it attempts to exclude a state of affairs in which the human mind has ideas of other bodies, or it attempts to exclude a case where the objects of the human mind are modes other than bodies, i.e., modes of the unknown attributes. It may also be the case (and indeed I believe it is the case) that Spinoza uses this proposition for both purposes. In the following, I will limit myself to showing that in this proposition the exclusion of modes of other attributes was at least part of Spinoza’s intention. Here is how Spinoza proves this proposition:
Dem.: For if the object of the human Mind were not the Body, the ideas of the affections of the Body would not be in God (by P9C) insofar as he constituted our Mind, but insofar as he constituted the mind of another thing, i.e. (by P11C), the ideas of the affections of the Body would not be in our Mind; but (by A4) we have ideas of the affections of the body. Therefore, the object of the idea that constitutes the human Mind is the Body, and it (by P11) actually exists.
Next, if the object of the Mind were something else also, in addition to the Body, then since (by IP36) nothing exists from which there does not follow some effect, there would necessarily (by P12) be an idea in our Mind of some effect of it. But (by A5) there is no idea of it. Therefore, the object of our Mind is the existing Body and nothing else, q.e.d.
 I turn first to the second part of the demonstration. Here Spinoza attempts to show that the object of the human mind cannot be something else, in addition to the body. Spinoza’s proof relies on E2a5, which reads:
We neither feel nor perceive any singular things [NS; or anything of natura naturata], except bodies and modes of thinking.
E2a5 excludes the possibility of us perceiving modes of any attributes other than Extension and Thought. Spinoza’s invoking of this axiom makes sense only if he attempts to prove by it that we do not have ideas of things other than bodies (and ideas), i.e., that these things cannot be the objects of the ideas which constitute our mind.​[73]​ E2a5 seems to be irrelevant to the question whether other bodies can be the objects of the human mind. 
	 I turn now to the first part of the demonstration, which aims at showing that the body must be the object of the human mind. Here is, roughly, how the demonstration goes. If the body were not the object of the human mind, then (given God’s omniscience and idea-things parallelism) it would have to be in the mind “of another thing” and not in our mind. But this cannot be the case since according to E2a4 we do have ideas of the body. Note that Spinoza does not say that if the body were not the object of our mind it would be in the mind “of another body,” but rather “of another thing.” This seems to imply that Spinoza attempts here to exclude a situation where the human body is perceived by the mind of another thing, whether this thing is a body or not. 
	But let’s assume for a moment that this “other thing” is a body. Let’s say, a certain turtle. In this case, E2a4 is supposed to exclude the possibility that my body is conceived by the turtle’s mind and not by my mind. Yet, E2a4 says only “We feel a certain body is affected in many ways.” From this we can conclude that we have knowledge of a body; but is the body we feel perhaps the turtle’s body (while the turtle’s mind ‘feels’ our body)? This possibility seems to me consistent with E2a4, and thus invoking E2a4 must aim at another target. Furthermore, why should Spinoza be bothered by the quite odd possibility that my body is the object of a mind of another body (while I have no knowledge of my body)? Of course Spinoza can address this odd possibility, but I think that it is much more likely that what he had in mind (in both parts of the demonstration) is primarily - though not exclusively​[74]​- the following. Since my body, my mind, the mode of the third attribute which is identical with my body, and the mind of that mode, are all parallel to each other, we should be bothered by the possibility of a mismatch between minds and their objects (e.g., if a human mind would have as its object not the parallel human body, but the parallel mode of the third attribute). The possibility of such a mismatch is excluded once we take into account E2a4 and E2a5 which assert that the human mind knows bodies and only bodies. If this was Spinoza’s aim in E2p13, then we can understand why he refers to the “mind of another thing” rather than “another body” in the first part of the demonstration. The mind, Spinoza considers here, is a mind of a mode of an attribute unknown to the human mind.
	The last text I wish to consider in this section appears in the scholium to E2p13, just before the beginning of the digression about the nature of bodies:
 [T]he things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate [animata]. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human Body must also be said of the idea of any thing [de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est].
 Notice that in this passage Spinoza speaks about the animation of all things or all individuals, and not merely all bodies.  The claim that all things - such as humans, rocks, bananas, as well as every mode of the 27th attribute - are animated may strike many as extremely counter-intuitive, but given Spinoza’s justification for this claim, I think it is unavoidable. In God, there is an idea for every thing, and this is all that is needed in order to make a thing animated or in order for it to have a mind. Just as God’s idea of the human body is the human mind, so too God’s idea of any other (finite) res is the mind of that res. 
	In this section we have seen several texts which corroborate Spinoza’s views in Letters 64 and 66 that (1) modes of other attributes have minds just like bodies do, and that (2) minds of modes of different attributes are not connected with each other ((2) is in fact a generalization of E2a5, which we have just discussed). In the next section we will discuss the textual evidence which supports the claim that (3) if Xn and Xm are modes of different attributes that are numerically identical, then the representation of Xn is also identical with the representation of Xm.
	2.5 As we have already seen, in Letter 66 Spinoza claims that “although each thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God [quamvis unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu], the infinite ideas in which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but an infinity of minds.” The meaning of ‘expressa’ in this passage is not easy to decipher. The closest formulation we find in the Ethics is in E2p7s. “So also a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways” [Sic etiam modus extesionis, et idea illius modi una, eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa]. Given Spinoza’s reference to E2p7s in the sentence that follows, it is very likely that Spinoza uses the word in both texts with the same meaning. The meaning of ‘expressa’ in E2p7s seems to be more accessible. This phrase in E2p7s says that a body and its idea are the same thing conceived under different attributes. In other words, ‘to express’ designates the relation of being an aspect, i.e., the relation that obtains between of a mode of God and its infinitely many modes of attributes. Now, how does this apply to Letter 66?
	The “infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God” are clearly the infinite ideas (technically, idea-aspects), which represent a mode of God as conceived under each attribute (recall that the only modes in an intellect are ideas). Note, however, that it is not the infinite aspects of this mode of God that are in God’s intellect, but rather the representations of these aspects. The representations of a mode of God under the infinitely many attributes are just the infinitely many aspects of God’s idea of this mode of God.​[75]​
	Another text which provides much support for the identification of ideas of modes of different attributes is E2p4:
God’s idea, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes, must be unique [Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest].
Clearly, this proposition is the Thought-equivalent of E1p16 which we have already encountered. E2p4 attributes to the idea of God a property which E1p16 attributes to God (i.e., that infinitely many things in infinitely many modes follow from it). Now, since God’s idea is a mode of Thought and since Spinoza rejects the possibility of any causal interaction between modes of different attributes (E1p10), there is only one class of things which can follow from the idea of God - ideas. Indeed, infinitely many ideas follow from God’s idea, but what is the meaning of the additional infinity which is asserted here (i.e., “in infinitely many modes,” or alternatively, “in infinitely many ways”​[76]​)?  I would argue that the “in infinitely many ways” phrase in E2p4 should be understood in the same way as we understand it in E1p16 (after which E2p4 is modeled). The “infinitely many ways” by which each idea follows from God’s idea are the infinitely many aspects of the same idea in God’s intellect, and by which one and the same idea can represent infinitely many modes. In several places in the Ethics, Spinoza assigns to the attribute of Thought in general, or to God’s idea in particular, this double infinity (“infinitely many things in infinitely many ways”).​[77]​ Spinoza never makes similar claims with regard to Extension or any other attribute. In all these places, he is suggesting this multi-faceted nature of ideas, i.e., their ability to represent modes of different attributes by one and the same idea, having a multiplicity of aspects.
	One place where Spinoza explicitly claims that ideas of identical modes are also identical, is in his discussion of ideas of ideas. To some extent, this is the most natural place for Spinoza to discuss it since already at the preface to second part of the Ethics, he tells his readers that from now on he will discuss 
those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or the infinite eternal Being - not, indeed, all of them, for as we have demonstrated (1p16) that infinitely many things must follow in infinite many modes, but only those that can lead us, by the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the human Mind and its highest blessedness. (Italics mine)
Spinoza’s concentration in the rest of the Ethics on the human mind and its blessedness makes the issue of minds of other attributes hardly relevant to his main line of investigation. The human mind “has no connection” with the minds of the other attributes, and therefore they appear only occasionally in marginal glosses (like in E2p13) in the rest of Ethics. Within the realm of Thought and Extension, the identity of ideas of different attributes is exhibited only in the identity of ideas of modes of Extension and Thought (whose ideata too are identical). But, since the mode of Thought which is identical with a certain body is the idea of that body, the parallel identity of the ideas of these two things is the identity of an idea with the idea of that idea.
	Spinoza claims this identity in E2p21:
This idea of the Mind is united to the Mind in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body.
In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza claims explicitly that the identity of an idea with the idea of that idea is a parallel to the identity of a body with its idea, which was asserted in E2p7s:
This proposition is understood far more clearly from what is said in P7S; for there we have shown that the idea of the Body and the Body, i.e. (by P13), the Mind and the Body, are one and the same Individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. So the idea of the Mind and the Mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, viz. Thought. (Italics mine)
Notice that in this demonstration Spinoza relies on multifaceted structure of God’s modes (the identity of a body and its mind), in order to show that the ideas of these two things must share the same structure, i.e., they are two aspects of a multifaceted idea. It is clear that in this scholium Spinoza assumes that if Xn and Xm are modes of different attributes that are two aspects of the same mode of God, then ideas of these modes must also be identical.
Let me tentatively summarize by suggesting that we have a solid body of textual evidence showing that Spinoza’s claims in Letters 64 and 66 are not only consistent with the rest of his system, but in fact are a direct and necessary result of some of the most important doctrines of Ethics. 
We may now answer the question which we have suspended for a while: how can the attribute of thought be isomorphic with the whole substance (according to the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7), but also be just an attribute, having the same order of modes just like any other attribute (according to the Inter-Attribute Parallelism). Spinoza’s solution to the apparent conflict is rather simple. The order of ideas is indeed equal to the order of modes in any of the other attributes. However, modes of Thought, unlike the modes of any other attribute, are multifaceted, in fact, infinitely faceted. Each idea has infinitely many aspects, so that each aspect of the idea represents a parallel mode under another attribute.
Let’s see now how the multifaceted structure of ideas makes the two doctrines of parallelism compatible. According to the Inter-Attributes Parallelism, the order of modes of Thought must be equal to the order of modes in any other attribute. This demand is satisfied, since the order of modes of Thought (the infinitely faceted ideas) parallels the order of bodies and with the order of mode of any other attribute. Now, the Ideas-Things Parallelism stipulates that the order of cognitions must parallel the order of things, and indeed, there is a perfect correspondence between the order of the infinitely faceted ideas and the order of their objects: God and the infinitely faceted modes. Each infinitely faceted Thought unit, picks an infinitely faceted object, and each idea-aspect picks a mode (or the substance) under one attribute. ​[78]​

	Part III: Some Ramifications
	3.1 Is the Inter-Attributes Parallelism derivable from the Ideas-Things Parallelism? -  In Part I of this paper, I have argued that the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7 and the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s are two distinct doctrines that are not derivable from each other. Now, once we have a fuller picture of the structure of the attribute of Thought, we can address one important objection to my claim that the two parallelism doctrines do not entail each other. This objection will suggest that, assuming the Ideas-Things Parallelism, we could infer the Inter-Attributes Parallelism by transitivity.  If the order of modes of Extension, (A1, B1, C1, D1,…) parallels the order of ideas in Thought (A2, B2, C2, D2,…), and if the order of modes of the third attribute (A3,B3,C3,D3,…) parallel the order of ideas, it would seem that we could infer the parallelism between the modes of Extension and the third attribute by transitivity (insofar as both parallel the order of ideas). If this inference through transitivity is valid, it would seem that – contrary to my claim in Part I - we can derive the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s from the Ideas-Things Parallelism of E2p7.​[79]​ 
	One apparent problem with such a derivation is that it may violate the conceptual separation of the attributes. If Extension and the third attribute parallel each other because of their relation to Thought, it would seem that two facts about Thought (its correspondence with both Extension and the third attribute) would explain the relation between two attributes external to Thought, and hence that some essential facts about these two attributes would turn out to depend on (conceived through) Thought.
	But are we sure that this transitive derivation violates the conceptual barrier? Here is a possible line of defense in favor of the derivation.​[80]​ Ideas and things do share some structural features. According to E2p8, for example, things that do not have duration have parallel ideas that also do not have duration. Once we know that “Napoleon the victor at Waterloo” is a thing that does not have duration, we can conclude that “the idea of Napoleon the victor at Waterloo” does not have duration. Spinoza clearly does not take such an inference to be a violation of the conceptual barrier. What an inference of that sort does is merely point out a common feature between the order of ideas and the order of things. Yet, the explanation for either kind of items lies within its own order (i.e., the non-durational nature of “the idea of Napoleon the victor at Waterloo” is explained only through other ideas). Now, one can argue that the derivation of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism from the Ideas-Things Parallelism relies on a similar consideration of the structural similarity between Thought and Extension and Thought and the third attribute, and as such it should be not considered a violation of the conceptual barrier.
So are we to finally conclude that the transitive derivation of the Inter-Attributes Parallelism from the Ideas-Things Parallelism is legitimate? Not at all. Here is why. In my original presentation of this inference, I suggested that order of the modes of Extension (A1,B1,C1,D1) parallel the order of ideas (A2,B2,C2,D2) and that these are the very same ideas which also parallel the modes of the third attribute (A3,B3,C3,D3). Yet, we are not, at this stage, entitled to assume the identity (or even parallelism) among ideas of different attributes. Recall that we are attempting to prove the Inter-Attributes Parallelism (E2p7s), relying on the Ideas-Things Parallelism (E2p7). All that E2p7 claims is that ideas have the same order as their objects. If A1 and A3 are identical (or parallel each other), then E2p7 stipulates that the ideas of A1 and A3 also be identical (or parallel each other). Now, Spinoza does think that A1 and A3 are identical and parallel each other, but this is just the Inter-Attributes Parallelism we are now attempting to prove. Obviously, however, if we were to assume the identity (or parallelism) of A1 and A3 at this stage, we will be committing a petitio principii, relying on the same doctrine we try to prove. 
But if we do not rely on the Inter-Attributes Parallelism, there is no reason to assume that the chains of ideas representing different attributes parallel each other. In other words, if body A1 were the cause of body B1, E2p7 would stipulate that the idea of Body A1 have to be the cause of the idea of body B1. Similarity, if a mode of the third attribute A3 were the cause of another mode of the third attribute B3, the idea of A3 would have to be the cause of the idea of B3. Yet, when we ask ourselves how does the idea of A1 relate to the idea of A3, we are left without any definite answer (as long as we do not appeal to the Inter-Attributes Parallelism of E2p7s). The idea of A1 can parallel the idea of A3, it may parallel the idea of B3, or neither one of the two. In other words, the parallelism among ideas (technically, idea-aspects) of different attributes relies on the Inter-Attributes Parallelism (and the Ideas-Things Parallelism), and therefore it cannot be used to prove the Inter-Attributes Parallelism. But if there is no parallelism among ideas of different attributes, there is no transitivity, since we have no reason to assume that these are the same ideas which parallel both modes of Extension and modes of the third attribute.
3.2 Before we conclude our discussion of the multifaceted structure of ideas, I would like to address one further point. One of the pivotal doctrines of the Ethics stipulates that attributes (and their modes) must be causally and conceptually separate from each other. Spinoza states this doctrine in E1p10 and elaborates it in E2p6d. Hence, modes of Thought and modes of Extension cannot interact and cannot be conceived through each other. The same applies to the relation between modes of any two attributes. We have also seen that no two representations (i.e., idea-aspects) of modes of different attributes can interact with each other. If the order of ideas is supposed to perfectly reflect the order of things, there must be an internal barrier within thought (i.e., between the representations of the attributes) which reflects the barrier between the attributes. Spinoza makes this point explicit in Letter 66. Yet here one may, and in fact should, press Spinoza further. If the infinite chains of idea-aspects are causally and conceptually separate from each other and since causal and conceptual separation is part of what makes an attribute an attribute, why will these infinite chains not constitute infinite attributes of thought. Attributes are conceptually and causally independent from each other, and since these chains of idea-aspects are causally and conceptually independent from each other, one may conclude that they should be considered as full-fledged independent attributes.​[81]​ While this suggestion will turn out to be wrong, it may teach us an interesting point about the conceptual barrier within thought, i.e., that this barrier is slightly weaker than the original barrier between the attributes.
	The infinite chains of idea-aspects cannot constitute infinite attributes because they share with each other their essential property of being thoughts, or modes of the attribute of thought, and as such they are not as independent from each other as are the modes of different attributes. We can make the same point from a different angle. Modes of different attributes are independent from each other, yet there are certain structural features that cut through all the attributes: all the attributes are self-conceived, and all share the fact that their modes are ordered in causal and temporal relations. Spinoza clearly allows the existence of such trans-attribute features, and does not take them to be a threat to the conceptual barrier between the attributes. In a similar way, we can conceive the relation between the chains of idea-aspects as adding one - yet crucial - component to this common layer. The chains of idea-aspects share with each other not only the structural properties of being temporally and causally ordered, but also the very essential fact that they are all modes of Thought. Thus, although the idea-aspects which represent different attributes are causally and conceptually separate, the barrier among them is weaker than the original barrier among modes of different attributes. Having a full-fledged conceptual barrier within Thought would imply that the chains of idea-aspects which represent different attributes are of completely different natures. This, however, is false since all these modes share the essential fact that they are all modes of Thought. 
	
	Conclusion: Spinoza’s Dualism of Thought and Being
	4.1 Why Spinoza cannot be a reductive idealist? - Given the special structure, role, and centrality Spinoza ascribes to Thought, one may be tempted to make Spinoza into an idealist. Insofar as Thought is coextensive with God (i.e., for everything that is, there must be a parallel idea-aspect in Thought) why not take the further step and say that Thought not only represents all things, but is also the origin of all things? ​[82]​ If Spinoza is taking the relation between Thought and the other attributes to be asymmetric insofar as Thought is both far more complex and has the unique ability to harbor absolute infinity, why not take a further step and explain this asymmetry in terms of Thought being the origin of the other attributes?
	The answer seems to be quite simple: Spinoza could not embrace idealism because of his commitment to the conceptual separation of the attributes. Had any of the other attributes been reduced to Thought, this attribute would not be “conceived through itself” (E1p10), and hence it would cease to be an attribute. The conceptual barrier between the attributes blocks the possibility of reducing any of the attributes to another attribute.
	Notice that the main threat to the barrier among the attributes comes from the side of Thought. Since Thought is far more complex than any other attribute, it appears as the most natural candidate to which all other attributes could have been reduced. Spinoza’s doctrine of the conceptual barrier aming the attributes precludes this reduction. Yet, Spinoza’s position seems to be far closer to idealism than to materialism. This, of course, provides little satisfaction for the idealist. In fact, Spinoza’s position places the idealist in a tormenting position: in it he can see the land from afar, but he will never reach it.
	4.2 Spinoza as a Substance Monist and an Attributes Pluralist. – In this paper I have put forward three bold theses. First, I have argued that what is commonly termed “Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism” is a result of a later confusion of two genuine and distinct Spinozistic doctrines of parallelism. Second, I have argued that, according to Spinoza, ideas are multifaceted, and that it is by virtue of this characteristic that one and the same idea can represent all the infinite modes which parallel it. This last suggestion solves one of the most crucial and stubborn problems in Spinoza’s metaphysics; it allows Thought to parallel both each single attribute and the totality of attributes altogether. Third, I have shown that, for Spinoza, we cannot know any attribute other than Thought and Extension for the simple reason that minds of modes of different attributes are causally separated, just like their objects. Obviously, this novel interpretation of the core of Spinoza’s philosophy demands further elucidation.  I hope the current paper breaks some ground in developing the outline of this interpretation.
	In the history of philosophy, Spinoza is commonly (and rightly) considered as the great monist of the modern era. But Spinoza is also a radical pluralist insofar as he claims the existence of infinitely many infinite and mutually independent attributes of the substance. Each of these attributes constitutes a realm as infinite as our physical world. The pivotal doctrine of the conceptual separation between the attributes fortifies this infinite plurality of attributes by excluding the possibility of any reduction of one attribute to another. Thus, side by side with his substance monism, Spinoza is also a radical attribute pluralist. His success in merging these two apparently opposed tendencies is one of the most fascinating achievements of his system.
	4.3 Spinoza’s Dualism. - From a third perspective, Spinoza is a dualist. This may seem, at first sight, as a trivial characterization since many commentators take Spinoza to be a mind-body (or Thought-Extension) dualist. Yet, this last characterization of Spinoza as a mind-body dualist is imprecise insofar as it fails to appreciate Thought’s preeminence in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Spinoza does not take Thought to be coextensive with merely the physical realm but rather with the whole substance. In this sense, Spinoza is a Thought-Being dualist; every single entity, including God, has its parallel twin in Thought. Indeed, Spinoza openly proclaims: “God’s actual power of thinking is equal to his power of acting.” This dualism is indeed quite surprising because Thought is just one aspect of the universe, and yet, I believe, it is a consistent position, and in the current paper I tried to elucidate and defend this position.
	Spinoza’s Thought-Being dualism also sheds new light on Spinoza’s practice of providing duplicate definitions - once in ontological terms and then in terms of conceivability - for the basic concepts of his ontology at the opening of Ethics.​[83]​ Thus, for example, ‘cause of itself’ is defined first ontologically, as “that whose essence involves existence,” and then in terms of its conceivability, as “that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” (E1d1). Similarly, ‘substance’ is defined as “what is in itself” and then as what “is conceived through itself” (E1d3). Apparently, for Spinoza, being thought, or being conceivable, is a feature as deep and basic as the very existence of things.
	4.4 Philosophical Import. – Clarifying and correcting our understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysics is an important task in itself. Yet, Spinoza’s understanding of the role and structure of Thought culminates in two bold challenges to our understanding of the nature of thought. First, Spinoza’s notion of Thought extends far beyond anything we would understand by this term. For Spinoza, Thought belongs not only to God and human beings, not only to all living beings, and not even to all extended things (rocks included), but rather accompanies everything that is, whether it is accessible to our minds or not. What we, human beings, understand by the term ‘Thought’ (i.e., ideas of extended things) is just a tiny fraction of Thought’s actual realm. In accordance with Spinoza’s deep critique of anthropomorphism and of the human hubris which evaluates all things from its limited perspective, Spinoza would view our notion of Thought, as “human, all too human.”​[84]​





	The view I ascribe to Spinoza is quite complex and in order to be as precise as possible I will use a semi-formal notation. We will begin with a very simple notation. First, we will assign numbers to each of the attributes. Extension will be the first attribute, Thought the second, and in a similar way we will assign numbers to all the other infinite attributes, which are unknown to human beings. Now, let N (Napoleon) be a mode of God (i.e., a mode under all attributes). Three of the infinitely many modes of attributes constituting N are: N1 - the body of N, N2 - the idea representing N, and N3 - a mode of attribute 3 (unknown to human beings), which is identical with N1 and N2. Tschirnhaus argues against Spinoza that if:
(1) N1 (Napoleon’ s body) is identical with N3
and
(2) N2 (Napoleon’s mind) is the idea of N1
Then:  
(3) N2 must also be the idea of N3 (insofar as N1= N3)
	Spinoza’s answer to this argument is that the idea of N1 (Napoleon’s mind), and the idea of N3 (the mind of mode N3) are causally independent from one another, i.e., instead of having one single representation, N2 is an idea having infinitely many aspects: N21 (the idea-aspect representing N1), N23 (the idea-aspect representing N3), N24 (the idea-aspect representing N4), and so on ad infinitum. N21 and N23 are taken by Spinoza as separate minds which have “no connection with each other” though they are both modes of Thought. Since a similar consideration would hold for any other mode of Extension, it seems that the picture we get is of Thought containing infinitely many infinite chains of representations. Each chain represents the modes of another attribute, and each chain is conceptually and causally separate from all other chains. To put it a bit more rigorously, if ‘X2y’ is the schema of modes of Thought so that ‘X’ (in the first position from the left) denotes the relevant mode of God (i.e., a mode under all the attributes), ‘2’ (in the second position from the left) designates that it is an idea, or a mode of Thought, and ‘y’ designates the attribute under which the object of the relevant idea is conceived (Extension (=1), Thought (=2), etc.), then all the ideas which share the same ‘y number’ are parts of a single chain. The conceptual and causal separation within Thought would simply mean that ideas with different ‘y numbers’ are causally and conceptually separate.
	What is the relation between ideas which share the same X number (e.g., the mind of Napoleon’s body, and the mind of N3)? They are just aspects of one and the same idea. In the same way that the body of Napoleon and N3 (the objects of these ideas) are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes (or two aspects of the same mode of God), so the idea of Napoleon’s body and the idea of N3 are one and the same idea, representing modes of different attributes. Thus, God’s idea of mode N has the same infinitely-faceted structure as N itself. 
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^1	  Unless otherwise marked, all references to the Ethics, the early works of Spinoza, and Letters 1-29 are to Curley's translation. In references to the other letters of Spinoza I have used Shirley's translation. I use the following standard abbreviations for Spinoza’s works: TdIE - Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect [Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione], TTP – Theological Political Tretises [Tractatus Theologico Politicus], KV – Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being [Korte Verhandeling van God de Mesch en deszelfs Welstand], DPP – Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy [Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I & II], and Ep. – Letters. Passages in the Ethics will be referred to by means of the following abbreviations: a(-xiom), c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium) and app(-endix); ‘d’ stands for either ‘definition’ (when it appears immediately to the right of the part of the book), or ‘demonstration’ (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third definition of part 1 and E1p16d is the demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1. I am indebted to Dan Garber, Don Garrett, John Morrison, Steven Nadler, Alison Simmons, Tad Schmaltz, Alex Silverman and especially a referee for PPR for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I owe a special debt to Michael Della Rocca not only because my interest in Spinoza is due in large part to him, but also because this work grew out of many challenging and joyful conversations with him.
^2	  In the existing literature there is certainly some awareness of possible discrepancies between E2p7 and E2p7s, yet I am not familiar with any work which shows, or even attempts to show, that the two texts assert two independent doctrines. For some works which exhibit this partial awareness, see Gueroult, Spinoza, II, 80-89; Bennett, Study, 153 and 184-5; Deleuze, Expressionism, 113-4; Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, 123-32
^3	  I take parallelism to be a relation of isomorphism in the strict sense of the term, i.e., one-to-one and onto mapping. This relation preserves the causal structure among the relata. In the current paper I try to avoid formalization in order to keep it as accessible as possible.
^4	  Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I 51 (AT IXB24| CSM I 210).
^5	  In my forthcoming article, “The Building-blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics” I develop and defend this interpretation of the attributes as irreducible, infinite, aspects of God.
^6	  In the second part of this paper, I show that for Spinoza, ideas are multifaceted. This will clarify the reason for our ignorance of the other attributes.
^7	  See, for example, Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 91-2.
^8	  One may suggest that the parallelisms between Extension and Thought and between Thought and C are transitive, and hence commit Spinoza to a parallelism between Extension and C. In §3.1 below I address this question and show that the last derivation relies on a petitio.
^9	  For Spinoza, everything that is real (God, His attributes, and all the modes) is a thing [res]. Cf. Della Rocca, Spinoza, 90-91.
^10	   In many places Spinoza takes idea and cognition [cognitio] to be interchangeable. See, for example, E2p19d, E2p20d, and Ep. 72
^11	   Gueroult (Spinoza II, 64 n. 39) and Macherey (Introduction II, 72, n. 1) point out that Leibniz was the first to use the term ‘parallelism’ in philosophical context. 
^12	   See E2p3 and E2p4.
^13	   In E1p21 Spinoza refers to God’s idea as an infinite mode. In E1p31, Spinoza asserts that God’s intellect is merely a mode (Cf. Letter 9), and in several other texts he identifies of God’s idea and the infinite intellect. See E2p4&d and KV I, xxii, note a (I/101/30-32). The reliance of E2p3d on E1p16 also supports this identity. Finally, the last sentence of E2a3 seems to imply that ideas are modes.
^14	   This point is made clear in the demonstration of E2p7 which refers to the idea corresponding to a thing as “the knowledge of” that thing. Further support comes from the corollary which explicates the Ideas-Things Parallelism as a relation between the objective content of ideas and the formal being of things external to Thought.
^15	  For a discussion of the distinction between representational and bare (or ‘blind’) parallelism, see Della Rocca (Representation, 19), Gueroult (Spinoza II, 76), and Nadler (Spinoza’s Ethics, 124).
^16	  One crucial example occurs in E2p20 and E2p21s. Here Spinoza invokes both doctrines but for different purposes.  E2p7 helps show that ideas of ideas correspond to first-order ideas, while E2p7s is brought to bear in order to show that ideas of ideas are identical with the original ideas (insofar as ideas of ideas are just aspects or facets of the original ideas, as I will explain in Part II below). This is precisely what one would expect Spinoza to do if he were aware of the distinction between the two doctrines. 
^17	  This conclusion somewhat surprised me since one would expect that the similarity between the doctrines results from some shared sources (E1p10 would be a natural suspect, yet I do not think E1p10 plays any role in motivating E2p7. If E1p16 (though E2p3) plays any role in motivating E2p7, then it would be a shared source of both doctrines. See, however, note 20 below on the role of E2p3 in motivating E2p7). Obviously, even if the doctrines share some source it does not show that either doctrine entails the other.
^18	   As Della Rocca points out (Representation, 22), in E2p9d Spinoza explicitly identifies the order of ideas as a causal order. Spinoza’s support for this claim by a reference to E2p7 shows that he understands E2p7 as claiming that ideas are causally connected. For a fascinating paper arguing that E1a4 pertains only to immanent causal relations, see John Morrison, “Restricting Spinoza’s Causal Axiom” (unpublished).
^19	   See Bennett (Spinoza’s Ethics, 127-30). 
^20	  See Della Rocca (Representation, 22-3). A particular gap that both Della Rocca and Bennett attempt to fill is that E1a4 alone (the only text cited in E2p7d) does not exclude the possibility of there being no modes of thought at all, or that there are not enough modes of thought to match the causal order of all things. Both scholars suggest that in E2p7d Spinoza silently relies on E2p3 in order to rule out these possibilities. This is definitely one possible strategy, though there seem to be other routes leading to the same conclusion. Here is an outline of an alternative proof. Relying on E1a2 we may infer that everything is conceived. E2d3 and E2a3 establish that ideas are the primary vehicle of Thought and conception. Thus, if there are any Thought-items (Cf. E2p1), there must be at least one idea. The second worry – that “the ideas of effects run only a certain finite length down the causal chain” (Della Rocca, Representation, 22) - is settelled in the following manner. Let us assume that M is the last mode down the causal chain that has parallel ideas. The next modes down the chain (the effect of M), M+1, must however be conceived (E1a2). Therefore, there must be an idea of M+1 (call it I(M+1)). Since M+1 is the effect of M, I(M+1) depends on (i.e., is conceived through) I(M) (E1a4: causation implying conception). This contradicts the assumption that M is the last mode down the chain that has parallel ideas.
^21	   Della Rocca’s reconstruction of E2p7d  (Representation, 22-3) does not appeal to the Inter-Attributes Parallelism.
^22	   For an explanation of why transitivity cannot guarantee this inference, see §3.1 below.
^23	   See Della Rocca, Representation, 129-30. Della Rocca suggests that one can derive the identity of modes in Ep7s from the parallelism between Thought and Extension plus the Identity of Indiscernibles (Representation, 129-140). Yet, his elegant reconstruction fails to explain the parallelism among non-Thought attributes.
^24	  I take modes to be properties or states inhering in the substance, but not much of the current paper hangs on this understanding.
^25	   Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 144. Cf. p. 145: “the trans-attribute differentiae cannot be intellectually grasped or conceived, i.e., there are no concepts of them”.
^26	   Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 146.
^27	   Cf. Ep. 9 IIV/45). For a similar critique of Bennett, see Wilson, “Notes on Modes and Attributes,” 585.
^28	  Unlike Bennett’s attribute-free differentiae, the notion of a mode under all attributes (a Mode of God) is perfectly consistent with E1a2 and E1p10s. Indeed, the best proof that an entity can be conceived under all attributes is God himself, defined as a substance having infinite attributes (E1d6). 
^29	   See Pollock, Spinoza, 153, and Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, 123.
^30	  See my “Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics”, Part II. In this paper I suggest an interpretation of Spinoza’s definition of attribute (E1d4), and show that what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance must indeed be an essential and irreducible feature or aspect of substance. If we use early modern terminology, the distinction between Spinoza’s substance and its attributes is a distinction of reasoned reason [ratio ratiocinatae], i.e., a distinction made by the intellect that must have foundation in reality. See Descartes CSM III 280| AT IV 349-50.
^31	  For two helpful attempts to explain the notion of aspect, see Moore, “Saving substitutivity in simple sentences”, and Baxter, “Self-Differing and Leibniz’s Law.”
^32	  For Spinoza’s contemporaries the distinction between a substance and its attributes is a distinction of reason, while the distinction between a substance and its modes is a modal distinction. See Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, I 62. In the second part of my “Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics” I show that for Spinoza too the distinction between the substance and its attributes is a distinction of reason.
^33	  This radical separation among different aspects of the same thing is unique to Spinoza. Normally, there is no reason to assume that aspects of the same thing cannot explain each other.
^34	   Gueroult makes the same distinction using roughly the same terminology as I do. He distinguishes between ‘modes of the substance’ and ‘modes of the attributes.’ See, for example, Gueroult, Spinoza I, 339. Cf. Joel Friedman, “Spinoza’s Problem of Other Minds”, 103. Deleuze (Expressionism, 110) claims that a mode is an affection of an attribute, whereas a modification is an affection of the substance. Deleuze provides no textual support for this claim. As far I can see, Spinoza uses the terms interchangeably (See, for example, E1p8s2 (II/50/7) where ‘modification’ is defined just like mode in E1d5. Cf. E1p22 where a modification is said to be “through the same attribute”. On the other hand, ‘mode’ in E1d5 is not attribute specific).
^35	  For further elaboration of the distinction between modes of God and modes of attributes, see my Spinoza Metaphysics of Substance and Thought, Chapter Two.
^36	  “[B]y Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or from any of God’s attributes, that is, all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God..” (E1p29s. My italics).
^37	  Tschirnhaus seems to have precisely this view in mind when he claims in Letter 65 that “each single things is expressed in infinite modes… although the particular modification which constitutes my mind and the particular modification which expresses my body are one and the same modification, this [modification] is expressed in infinite modes – in one mode through thought, in another through extension, in a third through some attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity.”
^38	  One might be tempted to read E1p16 as taking modes of attributes as modification of modes of God (Spinoza clearly allows for modes of modes. See E3d3). The problem with this suggestion is that a mode of God is supposed to relate to its modes of attributes in just the way the substance relates to its attributes; the attributes however are not modes of the substance (or, in other words, the distinction between the substance and attributes is a distinction of reason, not a modal distinction. See CM II, v | I/257/22-258/4).
^39	  Gueroult, the eminent Spinoza scholar, endorses the same view regarding the reliance of E2p7s on E1p16 (Spinoza I, 339): “E2p7s, which institutes the “parallelism” is nothing but an underscoring of the identity [asserted in E1p16].”
^40	  We may further ask why Spinoza defined God the way he did, but this important question will take us far afield from our subject.
^41	  See my “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance” (§6) for further elaboration of my reading of E1p16d.
^42	  Naturally one may ask why Spinoza put the two doctrines in such proximity if they are indeed independent from each other. In response, let me point out that the Inter-Attributes Parallelism appears as a scholium, not a corollary, of E2p7. It is not uncommon for Spinoza to discuss doctrines somewhat related or resembling the proposition in a scholium, even though these doctrines are not in any way derived from the proposition. A scholium is mainly a study of related issues. See Della Rocca (Representation, 115) for a similar point regarding E2p35 and E2p35s. I am indebted to Dan Garber for raising this point.The following table summarizes the differences between the two doctrines:Ideas-Things Parallelism	Inter-Attributes ParallelismE2p7		E2p7s (or E1p16)Representational	NoNo		Identity of parallel itemsEntails Ideas of Ideas	NoNo		Entails parallelism b/w Extension & 3rd Attribute Entails Mind-Body Parallelism	Entails Mind-Body Parallelism
^43	   Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 145-7.
^44	  I will shortly show that for Spinoza representations (i.e., idea-aspects) of modes belonging to different attributes cannot interact with each other. In other words, in addition to the causal and conceptual barrier among the attributes (E1p10 and E2p6) there is also an internal barrier within Thought among representations (idea-aspects) whose objects are modes of different attributes.
^45	  Earlier, in 1.3, I have argued that modes of attributes cannot be modifications of modes of God, since they relate to modes of God just as the attributes relate to God (and the attributes are attributes, not modes, of God). For the same reason, idea-aspects cannot be modes of the infinitely faceted idea. Instead, they relate to it in the same way that the attributes relate to God.
^46	    On Tschirnhaus see C.A. van Peursen (“E.W. von Tschirnhaus and the Ars Invendi”), E. Winter (E.W. Tschirnhaus und die Frühaufklärung in Mittel und Osteuropa), and Laerke (Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza).
^47	  Leibniz’s notes from a conversation he had with Tschirnhaus about Spinoza’s philosophy disclose a very similar understanding of Spinoza’s view: “He [Spinoza] thinks that there are infinite other positive attributes besides thought and extension. But in all of them there is thought, as here there is in extension”. We will shortly discuss this important passage. For a very helpful study of the Spinoza-Tschirnhaus-Leibniz triangle, see Kulstad (“Leibniz, Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus: Metaphysics à Trois, 1675-1676”). 
^48	   “The inconceivability of those attributes which escape us is not simply a truth of fact, but rather a truth of reason, deduced a priori from the adequate idea of God’s essence” (Gueroult, Spinoza II, 46).
^49	   Notice that, in the last sentence, Tschirnhaus is expressing the very same view I have elaborated above (1.3) regarding the relation between Modes of God and modes of attributes. What I call ‘Mode of God’ Tschirnhaus calls ‘modification’. What I call ‘mode of an attribute’ Tschirnhaus calls simply ‘mode.’ Tschirnhaus terms the relation between the two entities ‘expression.’  I am hesitant to use this term since I am not sure it has a univocal meaning in Spinoza. Notice that in the following letter Spinoza accepts Tschirnhaus’ view on the relation between a modification (Mode of God) and the modes (modes of attributes) expressed by it.
^50	   Tschirnhaus seems here to be confusing attributes and modes (Descartes tends to do that occasionally as well), or alternatively he may be referring to modes of Extension, not Extension itself. 
^51	  Namely, each idea (whose object is a mode of God) is expressed in infinitely many idea-aspects, or minds (if we use my terminology). 
^52	   Bennett, Spinoza’s Ethics, 78.
^53	    Joachim, Spinoza’s Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, 76 n. 1.
^54	   Joachim, Spinoza’s Tractatus, 76 n. 1. Cf. Pollock, Spinoza, 160. The original letter is lost. See Gebhardt’s notes to this letter (IV/424). 
^55	   Ep. 72 (Shirley 330).
^56	   Shirley 327.
^57	  The idea of the idea of a mode of God has infinitely many aspects as well. For a discussion of the infinite refraction of higher order ideas, see Chapter Four of my Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance and Thought.
^58	   See, however, §3.4 below for an important moderation of the conceptual barrier among the aspects of the same idea.
^59	  “Now, since Scripture usually, on account of the weakness of the people, depicts God as being like a man, and attributes to God a mind, a heart, affects of the heart, even a body and breath, therefore the Spirit of God, is often used in the Sacred Texts for the mind, i.e., heart, affect, force, and breath of the mouth of God… The Spirit of God also means, as we have said, God's breath, which is also improperly attributed to God in Scripture, just as a mind, heart, and a body are” (Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 1, III/25-6). Cf. E1p15s, where Spinoza criticizes “those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions.” Cf. Letter 2, where Spinoza criticizes Bacon, who “frequently takes the intellect for the Mind” (IV/9/9). Leibniz was clearly aware of Spinoza’s view that mind cannot be ascribed to God. See Adams, Leibniz, 126. 
^60	   Cf. Pollock (Spinoza, 161), Gueroult (Spinoza II, 46) and Matheron (Individu, 31).
^61	   “We said that although Nature has different attributes, it is nevertheless only one unique Being, of which all these attributes are predicated” (KV II xx  §4 [G I/97/11| C 137]). Cf. Lewis Robinson, Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik, 282. For a discussion of early modern notions of what constitutes a separate world, see my “Spinoza, Tschirnhaus et Leibniz: Qu’est un monde?“.
^62	  Cf. E2p7c: “Whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection.”
^63	  TdIE § 41 (II/16/27-17/1). 
^64	  ‘Soul’ and ‘mind’ seem to have the same meaning for Spinoza. Compare the first sentence of the quote below with E2p13.
^65	   KV Appendix II,  § 9 (I/119/6-13). Italics mine. In an editorial note to this passage, Edwin Curley writes: “This suggests that as early as the Short Treatise Spinoza conceived of thought as coextensive with all other attributes, and hence more ‘extensive’ than any other taken singly - i.e., that what some have seen as a damaging admission made in response to the criticism of Tschirnhaus was an acknowledged part of the theory all along” [C 154, n. 5]. Curley is here making a very important historical point, though, unlike Curley, I believe that the problem of the wider extension of Thought was solved by the identification of paralleling ideas of modes of different attributes.
^66	   Italics mine. Cf. KV Appendix II, § 12 (I/120/1-6). Cf. KV II, xxii (I/101/15): “[T]here can be nothing in Nature of which there is not an idea in the soul of the same thing.” 
^67	   KV I, i note d (I/17/35-43).
^68	   See Della Rocca, Representation, 12, 100. In the Short Treatise (and in his other early writings), Spinoza is much closer to Descartes, who maintain a less rigorous distinction between the attributes. Cf. Donagan, Spinoza’s Dualism, 101.
^69	   See, for example, the two passages just cited from Appendix II where Spinoza claims that the soul ‘arises’ from its object.
^70	   Pollock, Spinoza, 161. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften, 6th Series, Volume 3, 385 (lines 12-15). I slightly amended Pollock’s translation by replacing ‘in this world’ by ‘here’, which is more loyal to the Latin ‘hic’.
^71	   According to the Academy editors, the notes were written sometime between October 1675 and February 1676, probably at the end of this period. This makes them later than Letter 66 (dated August 1675) and probably later than Letter 70.
^72	   Of course, that Leibniz understood Spinoza in a way very similar to Tschirnhaus is not a surprise, because at this point in time most of his knowledge of the Ethics came through Tschirnhaus.
^73	   Cf. Della Rocca, Representation, 28.
^74	   The use to which Spinoza puts E2p13 in later propositions seems to show that E2p13 is aimed for both purposes.
^75	  As I have already argued (see notes 38 above), idea-aspects are not modes of the idea to which they belong, since the relation between an idea and its aspects is modeled after the relation between substance and its attributes (and is the same as the relation between modes of attributes and the mode of God to which they belong).
^76	   Parkinson, Shirley, and White translate the second infinity “in infinite ways.” For the current purpose, there is not much of a difference between the two translations.
^77	   See, for example, E2p1s and E2p3d.
^78	  I discuss the implications of my reading to the issues of (i) high-order ideas (i.e., ideas of ideas), and (ii) ideas of natura naturans in Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance and Thought, Ch. 4.
^79	   As I have pointed in Part I, the transitivity argument is clearly not Spinoza’s official explanation for the inter-attributes parallelism. Yet, if this argument turns out to be valid, it would undermine the independence of the two doctrines.
^80	   See Della Rocca (Representation, 20) for a similar argument.
^81	  For an elegant presentation of the infinitely many attributes of thought view, see Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 146 (diagram 2).
^82	   Indeed, recently, Michael Della Rocca relied on the Principle of Sufficient Reason to argue that the co-extensiveness of conceivability and existence (i.e., of Though and Being) cannot be a brute fact. According to Della Rocca’s “twofold use of the PSR,” not only must everything be intelligible, rather everything must be intelligible in terms of, or reduced to, conceivability and Thought (Spinoza, 261-7, and “Rationalism run Amok”). While I accept Della Rocca’s view about the centrality of the PSR in Spinoza’s system, as well as his “to be is to be conceived” slogan (Spinoza, 9), I take this slogan to assert a non-reductive equilibrium between Thought and Being. Della Rocca stresses that conceivability is essential to everything that is (and I completely agree with this point). Yet, it is also the case that having a content that is external to Thought is essential to any idea (for Spinoza’s rejection of empty ideas or ideas whose ultimate object is not external to Thought, see E2p23). Thus, we have opposite reductive pressures from both sides of the Thought-Being equilibrium. The reason for the equilibrium itself – i.e., for the fact that Thought and Being are coextensive - is the natures of existence and Thought, and therefore the co-extensiveness of Thought and existence is not brute, and we have no reason that compels us to identity Thought and Being (see my “Rationalism, Idealism and Monism in Spinoza”). For Della Rocca’s attempt to reconcile his view with the conceptual barrier among the attributes (E1p10), see his ”Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond.” For an insightful attempt to defend Della Rocca’s “the twofold use of the PSR” without embracing idealism, see Newlands “Another Kind of Spinozistic Monism.” For an earlier commentator who was led by the co-extensiveness of Thought and Being to ascribe idealism to Spinoza, see Pollock, Spinoza, 161-2.
^83	  Leibniz (Loemker 196) complains that Spinoza’s definition of substance is obscure insofar as it does not explain how the two parts of the definition (‘to be in itself’ and ‘to be conceived through itself’) relate to each other. According to my reading, this manner of parallel definitions is adequate, since it stresses the equal power of existence and thought. Had Spinoza used only the conceivability part of the definition, we would have been inclined to read him as a reductive idealist. Had he defined his basic terminology only in ontological terms, Thought’s place in his system would be downgraded, and it would be taken as merely one out of the infinitely many attributes.
^84	  See my “Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism.”
